We study corporate spinoffs with changes in CEO compensation 
Introduction
A corporate spinoff divides a company into two or more independent firms and offers a firm an opportunity to improve managerial incentives with fresh compensation packages directly tied to its own stock price. The initial round of studies on corporate spinoffs shows that the market reaction on spinoff announcements is significantly positive at about 3% on average. 1 The subsequent research explains the source of gains based on improved business focus or information. 2 More recently, removing diversity costs and negative financial synergies is suggested as the source of gains from spinoffs. 3 Unfortunately, these explanations are neither mutually exclusive nor inconsistent with the explanation based on managerial incentives. 4 Although scholars in disciplines including financial economics have studied managerial compensation to reduce agency conflicts between shareholders and managers for decades, there is no empirical evidence on whether corporations implementing spinoffs enhance managerial incentive compensation for either the post-spinoff parent firms (hereafter "post-parents") or the spinoff subsidiaries. 5 Little is known, either, about whether enhancing managerial incentives following spinoffs are related to operating performance improvements.
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See Butch and Nanda (2003) and Kwak (2001) for diversity costs and Leland (2007) for financial synergies. 4 See Aron (1991) and Seward and Walsh (1996) . 5 Although no parent/subsidiary relation exists following spinoffs, we refer to spinoff divisions as spinoff subsidiaries for convenience. We focus on these corporate spinoffs to examine the impact of spinoffs on managerial incentives.
within a multi-divisional firm, spinoffs enable corporations to design and implement fresh compensation packages that are based on the stock price of separated divisions. This potentially changes and improves managerial incentives. Examining changes in the pay-performance sensitivity (hereafter "PPS") with business focus related to operating performance will shed insights on how firms use managerial incentive compensation following spinoffs.
The results from analyzing PPS suggest that changes in managerial incentives following spinoffs have significant explanatory power on value enhancements for spinoff subsidiaries rather than for post-parents. Results supporting the managerial incentive hypothesis are that spinoff subsidiaries increase PPS in line with size effects; that PPS for subsidiaries does not decrease when the CEO of pre-spinoff parent firms (hereafter "pre-parents") jumps to a spinoff subsidiary; and that changes in PPS for spinoff subsidiaries created from the focus-increasing (hereafter "FI") spinoff are higher than those for those created from the non-focus-increasing (hereafter "NFI") spinoff. 6
The investigation of changes in operating performance provides additional intuition in distinguishing the managerial incentive hypothesis from the business focus hypothesis. We find evidence supporting the managerial incentive hypothesis and against the business focus hypothesis. Operating performance improves with managerial incentives, while it does not with business focus following spinoffs. While the relation between business focus and operating performance is minimal, the relation between managerial incentives and operating performance is significant.
Hypotheses Development

Changing Managerial Incentives
Aron (1991) argues that corporate spinoffs themselves act as incentives for divisional managers because the stock value of a diversified parent firm is a noisy signal of the productivity of any division and that of a spinoff subsidiary reflects a cleaner measure of the performance of a division. Thus, a spinoff subsidiary can naturally improve managerial incentives by increasing its PPS relative to the parent's PPS, while the parent with remaining multiple divisions does not change PPS.
For spinoff transaction it is natural that firms experience downsizing and thus increase the sensitivity. To exhibit genuine improvements in managerial incentives following spinoffs, the increased PPS for either post-parents or spinoff subsidiaries must be at least consistent with those for pre-parents adjusting for size effects. 7 Schaefer (1998) examines the relation between firm size and PPS and finds that the sensitivity appears to be approximately inversely proportional to the square root of firm size, while he ignores the changes in the value of previously granted stock options in his regression analysis. We estimate the regression model using the data with the changes in the value of previously awarded stock options and compare the size-induced sensitivities with the estimated sensitivities for spinoff subsidiaries to control for size effects. Thus, we estimate the following equation using the sample in pre-parents:
Pay-performane sensitivi~,= a + fix ~/MarketValueof commonstock +6,
where PPS is computed from stock options and stock holdings. Using the estimates of the coefficients above and the market values, we compute the fitted
